

## International Relations Theory II: Norms and International Institutions

February - June, 2020

**Post-Corona Crisis Version**

(revised and updated on 19 March 2020)

### Course outline and objectives

- A firm grasp of why, how, and by whom are international norms and institutions created in world politics.
- How do norms change over time and how do international institutions work in practice.
- Skills to critically read and comment IR scholarship.
- Skills to resolve practical problems involving international norms and institutions.
- Skills to craft a long essay that connect concepts and theories to the realities of international institutions today.
- Skills to manage collaborative work online.

### Online Course Structure

Teams: Students will be divided up in teams of 4 persons each (two groups in T2 will have five members). Members will name their team, develop a visual logo, and start a WhatsApp group with the name/logo to conduct easy, quick intra-team communication. Team members will be divided alongside the four following roles: *Secretary* (responsible for representing the team during Q&As), *Speaker* (responsible for speaking up for the group during Sections), *Editor* (responsible for editing and submitting the final version of each team assignment), and *Facilitator* (responsible for selecting and distributing useful content online for each assignment plus ensuring there are no free-riders in the group, *ninguém solta a mão de ninguém*). When the group has five members, the fifth member will share the burden with both the facilitator and the editor. Individual roles will change each week. Team membership will remain constant for the duration of this course.

Lectures: Lectures online will be organized in 2 separate 15' slots, including a general overview of the topic at hand, a summary of the main debates in the field, and detailed commentary on the kinds of questions that students should be able to answer when confronted to that particular

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topic. Lecture slots will be separated by one 10' Q&As and one 5' break. The *Secretary* in each team will speak up for the group during Q&A.

Sections: These review the key arguments and concepts in the pre-assigned readings for each class. The *Speaker* in each group will lead the conversation. Sections will last roughly 20'-25' each. The instructor will call upon individual students during sections. Failure to engage will subtract 2 points from the team's assignment that week, so do your reading before class.

Breakout Team Work: In each class, teams will have a chance to meet in breakout groups for around 20'. This is your opportunity to get your assignment moving as much as possible *during* class. The instructor will pop in and out of breakout sessions to consult and advise.

Instructor availability: Because quarantines are so disruptive and challenging, the instructor will be online some ten minutes before starting time for each class. You can join Zoom for an informal group chat and discussion about how we're all coping with these unusual and unsettling circumstances.

## Course Requirements and Grading

Final grades will be assigned as follows:

- Individual performance as a group member: 20%
- One exam (you've done this already on March 16<sup>th</sup> 2020): 10%
- Seven group assignments: 40%
- Long essay: 30%

Individual performance as a team player: Grading will reflect the student's active engagement in the roles within the team: *Secretary*, *Speaker*, *Editor*, and *Facilitator*. You are not expected to perform all four functions if you don't feel comfortable with it, but roles should rotate for each assignment. You will be graded on the back of the materials you upload on E-Class for each assignment. See *Instructions for Teams* document.

Exam: You have done this already on 16<sup>th</sup> March 2020. If you happen to take Reaval for this course, then you will be assessed on the basis of your answer to one single exam question encompassing the contents of the entire course.

Assignments: Grades for each one of the seven assignments will be given to the entire team, so make sure you give it your best and don't hurt your fellow team members. Grading will be given on a scale from zero to 10, following the criteria specified below. Assignments may be submitted in English or Portuguese. If a team member who is called upon to engage the debate during

Sections fails to do so, two points will be subtracted from that week's team assignment. Assignments are due at 6pm the day of submission via E-Class.

Long Essay: Each student will submit a 10-page essay in response to a preestablished question to be cleared with the instructor during the first month of class. Essays should be posted on E-Class by 8pm on Mon, June 15, 2020. Essays received after the deadline will be dropped four full points on a 10-point scale and will not be received after June 20, 2020. The Long Essay is not a summary of the readings, and it should be written with an informed but non-expert readership in mind (so you can focus on the discussions that matter most rather than get entangled in minutiae). More detailed instructions on essay structure will be given in the first week of class. Essays may be submitted in English or Portuguese.

### **Criteria for Marking the Assignment**

8 or above: Work shows excellent command of the topic. It is well organized, clearly expressed and cogently argued. Work in this category will either approach the question from an unexpected angle, contain unusually illuminating or original thinking, or be especially well illustrated.

7,5 to 7,9: Work in this category shows excellent command of the topic. It is well organized, clearly expressed and cogently argued.

6,5 to 7,4: Work in this category shows sound knowledge of the topic. It displays very good understanding of the question and it is clearly organized and cogently argued. The argument is detailed, precise, and clear.

6 to 6,4: Work in this category shows sound knowledge of the topic. It is clearly organized and cogently argued. Achieving this mark on a question means that the student has firm control of the essential points.

5,5 to 5,9: Work in this category shows some weaknesses in terms of its accuracy, coherence, detail, organization, or focus.

5 to 5,4: Work in this category shows extensive weaknesses in terms of its accuracy, coherence, detail, organization, or focus. The candidate has firm control of at least some of the essential points.

4 to 4,9: Work in this category shows some basic knowledge of the topic. Yet it displays some serious deficiencies in terms of its accuracy, coherence, detail, organization, or focus.

3 to 3,9: Work in this range shows an attempt to answer the question set, but it is either irrelevant to the question set, incoherent, unsystematic, superficial, or unacceptably brief.

1 to 2,9: Work in this category fails to show any basic knowledge of the topic.

Zero: Work that features evidence of plagiarism.

### **Online Course Policies**

- Online learning entails several risks, including lack of concentration and boredom. The instructor will do his best to offer as lively a meeting as he possibly can, but you should do your outmost to stay clear of these risks. Switch off your email and WhatsApp during class, and don't go anywhere near Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, TikTok or any other

apps. If you need external help to make this happen, download and use Cold Turkey (for PC and Mac), StayFocused (Android and OS), or Forest App.

- If you share your room or the house with someone else, make sure they know the times in which you will be taking an online class so they disrupt your concentration as little as possible.
- It is the policy of the School of International Relations at FGV that all cases of academic dishonesty – including plagiarism – be reported to the Undergraduate Committee and their Chair.
- The readings for this class are available in electronic format on E-class.
- Schedule office hours electronically. These will be held on Mondays and Fridays, 2-5pm, via Skype.

## Course Schedule

### Lecture 1 – Course Overview and Introduction

## PART I – The Origins of International Organizations

### Lecture 2 – Cooperation under Anarchy: International Organizations

- \*Pevehouse, Jon and Borzyskowski, Inken von. 2017. "International Organizations in World Politics." In Cogan, Jacob Katz, Hurd, Ian and Johnson, Ian, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of International Organizations*. Oxford University Press. 18p.

### Lecture 3 – Cooperation under Anarchy: International Regimes

- \*Krasner, Stephen. 1982. "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences : Regime as Intervening Variables," *IO* 36(2):185-205.
- \*Simmons, Beth. 2009. *Mobilizing for Human Rights : International Law in Domestic Politics*. Cambridge University Press : 23-56.

#### Highly Recommended:

- Stein, Arthur A. 1982. "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World." *IO* 36(2): 299-324.

### Lecture 4 – Realism

- \*Mearsheimer, John. 1994. "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security* 19(3): 5-49.
- \*Michael J. Glennon. 2003. "Why the Security Council Failed", *Foreign Affairs* 82/3:16-35.

### Lecture 5 – Liberalism

- \*Keohane, Robert. 1997. "International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?" *Foreign Policy*: 82-96.
- \*Keohane, Robert O. and Lisa L. Martin. 1995. "The Promise of Institutional Theory." *International Security* 20(1): 39-51.

### Lecture 6 – Constructivism

- Gilardi, Fabrizio. 2013. "Transnational Diffusion: Norms, ideas, and Policies," in Walter Carlsnaes et. al., eds., *Handbook of International Relations*. London: Sage: 453-477.
- \*Finnemore Martha. 2003. *The Purpose of Intervention*. Cornell University Press: 24-51.

*Highly Recommended:*

- Risse, Thomas. 2013. "Transnational Actors and World Politics," in Walter Carlsnaes et al., eds., *Handbook of International Relations*. London: Sage: 426-452.
- Finnemore, M. (1996). "Norms, culture, and world politics: insights from sociology's institutionalism," *IO*, 50(2):325-347.
- Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *IO* 52(4): 887-917.

**Lecture 7 – Critical Theory**

- \*Cox, Robert W. (2014). "Critical Theory." In Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkison, eds., 2014. *International Organization and Global Governance*. London: Routledge. 157-168.
- \*Jennings, Kathleen M. 2019. "Conditional Protection? Sex, Gender, and Discourse in UN Peacekeeping," *International Studies Quarterly* 63(1):30-42.

**Lecture 8 – Design of IO's**

- \*Voeten, Erik. 2019. "Making Sense of the Design of International Institutions," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 22: 147-163.

**Lecture 9 – Research Proposal for the Long Essay due**

**Lecture 10 – Exam 1**

## PART II – The Institutionalization and Working of International Institutions

### Assignment 1 (encompasses lectures 11, 12, and 13)

The Director General of the World Health Organization (WHO) is concerned that countries in coming months will move away from treating the organization as the global focal point in the struggle against the Covid-19 pandemic. Write a policy note in up to five pages that lays out a strategy to reverse the trend. *Skill goals*: Develop a working command of the concepts of legalization, delegation, and orchestration, as well as their observable implications; have a grasp of the challenges to cooperation the world currently faces concerning the pandemic.

#### Lecture 11 – Legalization

- \*Abbott, Kenneth W., Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal. 2000. "The Concept of Legalization," *IO* 54(3): 401-19.

#### Highly Recommended:

- Finnemore, Martha and Stephen J. Toope. 2001. "Alternatives to 'Legalization': Richer Views of Law and Politics," *IO* 55(3): 743-58.
- Goldstein, Judith, Miles Kahler, Robert Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. 2001. "Response to Finnemore and Toope," *IO* 55(3): 759-60.
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Brad LeVeck, David G. Victor, James H. Fowler. 2014. "Decision Maker Preferences for International Legal Cooperation." *IO* 68(4): 845- 876.

#### Lecture 12 – Delegation

- \*Abbott, Kenneth and Duncan Snidal. 1998. "Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(1): 3-32.

#### Highly Recommended:

- Nielson, Daniel L and Michael J. Tierney. 2003. "Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform," *IO* 57(2): 241- 76.
- Lake, David A. and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2006. "The Logic of Delegation to International Organizations," In *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney, eds. Cambridge University Press, 341-68.

#### Lecture 13 – Orchestration

- \*Abbott, Kenneth W., Philipp Genschel, Duncan Snidal, and Bernhard Zangl. 2015. "Orchestration," In Abbott et al., eds., *International Organizations as Orchestrators*. Cambridge University Press: 3-36.

## Assignment II (encompasses lectures 14 to 17)

The World Bank, UNDP, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation have just announced an international conference to discuss the future of poverty alleviation after the Covid-19 pandemic recedes. Your team is advising a group of small NGO's working on local development projects in Africa and North Eastern Brazil who will have a seat at the conference. Write a memo in up to four pages laying out what reforms should be implemented by the conference conveners if they genuinely seek productive change. Skill goals: Identify the pathologies of international institutions, and the best way to address them.

### Lecture 14 – Pathologies of International Institutions

- \*Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore. 1999. "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations" *IO* 53(4): 699-732.

#### Highly Recommended:

- Voeten, Erik. 2008. "The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights," *American Political Science Review* 102(4): 417- 33.
- Vaubel, Roland. 2006. "Principal-agent Problems in International Organizations," *The Review of International Organizations* 1(2): 125-38.

### Lecture 15 – Democratic Deficit

- \*Moravcsik, Andrew. 2004. "Is There a 'Democratic Deficit' in World Politics? A Framework for Analysis," *Government and Opposition* 39(2): 336-63.

#### Highly Recommended:

- Nye, Joseph. 2001. "Globalization's Democratic Deficit: How to Make International Institutions More Accountable," *Foreign Affairs* (July/August).
- Dahl, Robert A. 1999. "Can International Organizations be Democratic? A Skeptic's View." In *Democracy's Edges*. Ian Shapiro, ed. Cambridge University Press, 19-36.

### Lecture 16 – Questions of Legitimacy

- \*Zaum, Domink, "Legitimacy." In Cogan, Jacob Katz, Hurd, Ian and Johnson, Ian, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of International Organizations*. Oxford University Press:

#### Highly Recommended:

- Hurd, Ian. 1999. "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," *IO* 53 (2): 379-408.

### Lecture 17 – Perspectives on Accountability

- Koenig-Archibugi, Mathias. 2017. "Accountability." In Cogan, Jacob Katz, Hurd, Ian and Johnson, Ian, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of International Organizations*. Oxford University Press: 1146-1169.

#### Recommended

- Grant, Ruth W. and Robert O. Keohane. 2005. "Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 99(1): 29-43.



**Lecture 18 – Long Essay preparation: the Literature Review.** This class includes a synchronous exercise for which you will receive instructions beforehand.

**Lecture 19 – Long Essay preparation: writing case studies and historical accounts.** This class includes a synchronous exercise for which you will receive instructions beforehand.

## **PART III – Trust and Power in International Institutions**

### **Assignment III (encompasses lectures 20 to 22)**

A presidential candidate running for office in Brazil in 2022 has asked your team to design a new regional organization to substitute the now defunct Unasur. He wants to know how to make it happen -- membership rules, scope of issues, and rules of conduct. Let him know if up to 4 pages. Skill goals: Capture how trust and power are intermingled in the creation and operation of international institutions.

#### **Lecture 20 – Cooperation without Hegemony**

- \*Rathbun, Brian C. 2011. "Before Hegemony: Generalized Trust and the Creation and Design of International Security Organizations." *IO* 65(2): 243-273.

#### **Lecture 21 – Weakness in IOs**

- \*Schneider, Christina. 2011. "Weak States and Institutionalized Bargaining Power in International Organizations." *International Studies Quarterly* 55(2): 331-355.

#### **Lecture 22 – Bargaining**

- \*Stone, Randall. 2008. "The Scope of IMF Conditionality," *IO* 62(4): 589-620.

### **Assignment IV (encompasses lectures 23 to 25)**

Some large carbon-emitter countries formally adhere to international norms and procedure to curb carbon emissions without ever really complying with them. A group of civil society activists is trying to come up with a solution to drastically reduce the incentives of these large, powerful cheaters to keep cheating. They have hired your team to help them come up with practical solutions to the problem. Give them a roadmap in up to 4 pages. Skill goals: Understanding why and how states bend the rules and get away with it, and solutions to the problem.

#### **Lecture 23 – Enforcement**

- \*Donno, Daniela. 2010. "Who Is Punished? Regional Intergovernmental Organizations and the Enforcement of Democratic Norms," *IO* 64(4): 593-625.

#### *Highly Recommended:*

- Fearon, James. 1998. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation." *IO* 52(2): 269-305.

#### **Lecture 24 – Dispute Settlement**

- \*Crook, John R. 2017. "Dispute Settlement." In Cogan, Jacob Katz, Hurd, Ian and Johnson, Ian, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of International Organizations*. Oxford University Press: 644:662.

#### *Highly Recommended:*

- Allee, Todd L. and Paul K. Huth. 2006. "Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover," *American Political Science Review* 100(2): 219-34.



- Gilligan, Michael J. 2006. "Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the International Criminal Regime," *IO* 60(4): 935-67.

### Lecture 25 – Flexibility

- Kucik, Jeffrey and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. "Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime," *IO* 62(3): 477-505.

#### Highly Recommended:

- Rosendorff, Peter and Helen Milner. 2001. "The Optimal Design of International Trade Agreements: Uncertainty and Escape," *International Organization* 55(4): 829-857.

### Assignment V (encompasses lectures 26 to 28)

A group of academics is trying to understand why and how South American countries failed to make Venezuela comply with its basic human rights commitments under international law and within Mercosur. They hire your team to help them re-write the story: what could regional states have done back in the day to ensure compliance with these norms, if anything at all? And why? Skill goals: Grasp the politics of compliance.

### Lecture 26 – Compliance and Effectiveness

- \*Simmons, Beth. 2010. "Treaty Compliance and Violation," *Annual Review of Political Science* 13: 273-96.

#### Highly Recommended:

- Xinyuan, Dai. 2005. "Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism." *IO* 59(2): 363-398.
- Von Stein, Jana. 2005. "Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance." *American Political Science Review*, 99(4):611-622.

### Lecture 27 – Socialization: Naming and Shaming

- \*Hafner-Burton, Emilie. 2008. "Sticks and Stones: The Efficacy of Human Rights 'Naming and Shaming'," *IO* 62: 689–716.
- \*Terman, R., & Voeten, E. 2018. "The relational politics of shame: Evidence from the universal periodic review," *The Review of International Organizations*, 13(1):1-23.

#### Highly Recommended:

- Kelley, Judith G., and Beth A. Simmons. 2019. "Introduction: The Power of Global Performance Indicators," *IO* 73(3):491-510.

### Lecture 28 – Empirical Applications

- \*Simmons, Beth and Allison Danner. 2010. "Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court," *IO* 64: 225-256.
- \*Tingley, Dustin and Michael Tomz. 2019. "The effects of naming and shaming on public support for compliance with international agreements: an experimental analysis of the Paris agreement." *Unpublished Working Paper*. Harvard University and Stanford University.

*Highly Recommended:*

- Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. 2005. "Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression," *IO* 59(3): 593-629.
- Vreeland, James Raymond. 2008. "Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture." *IO*: 65-101.

**Lecture 29 – Long Essay preparation: the Conclusion**

**Lecture 30 – Long Essay preparation: the Policy Recommendations**

**Lecture 31 – Long Essay preparation: the Introduction**

**PART IV – The Transformation of International Institutions**

**Assignment VI (encompasses lectures 32 to 35)**

Complexity can under certain circumstances erode international institutions, and fragmentation among international organizations may undermine cooperation. Your team is advising a coalition of developing states on the global governance of cyber security, now that the US and China seem to be polarizing the whole world over 5G technologies. Give them up to five pages of a risk assessment.

**Lecture 32 – Complexity I: Regime Complex**

- \*Alter, Karen J. and Sophie Meunier. 2009. "The Politics of International Regime Complexity," *Perspectives on Politics* 7(1): 13-24.
- \*Keohane, Robert O. and David G. Victor. 2011. "The Regime Complex for Climate Change," *Perspectives on Politics* 9(1): 7-23.
- \*Drezner, Daniel W. 2009. "The Power and Peril of International Regime Complexity." *Perspectives on Politics* 7(1): 65-70.

**Lecture 33 – Complexity II: Hierarchy in Regimes Complexes**

- \*Tyler Pratt. 2018. "Deference and Hierarchy in International Regimes Complexes." *IO* 72(3): 561-590.

**Lecture 34 – Forum Shopping**

- \*Busch, Marc L. 2007. "Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade." *IO* 61(4): 735-61.
- \*Kinne, Brandon J. 2018. "Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network," *IO* 72(4): 799-837.

**Lecture 35 – Evolution and Change**

- \*Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. 1998. "Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism," *IO* 52(2): 397-419.

- \*Lipscy, Phillip. 2015. "Explaining Institutional Change: Policy Areas, Outside Options, and the Bretton Woods Institutions," *AJPS* 59(2): 341-356.

*Highly Recommended:*

- Pierson, Paul. 2000. "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," *American Political Science Review* 94(2): 251-67.

### **Assignment VII (encompasses lectures 36 to 38)**

Consider that you are a high-level diplomat in Brazil producing on a policy paper about how Brazil should navigate in the context of the crisis of Liberal International Order (LIO) in the next decade. How should Brazil behave? More specifically, you must be addressing the following questions: What kind of challenge does populism pose to international institutions and LIO? How international institutions may survive this crisis? Drawing on the debates about LIO, populism, and the future of international institutions write a policy paper outlining Brazil's strategy by emphasizing the questions mentioned above in up to 4 pages.

Skill goals: Understanding the crisis of LIO and its potential implications for the future of international institutions.

#### **Lecture 36 – Liberal International Order (LIO)**

- \*Ikenberry, John. 1998/1999. "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order," *International Security* 23(3) : 43-78.
- \*Schweller, Randall L. 2001. "The problem of international order revisited: A review essay." *International Security* 26(1): 161-186.

#### **Lecture 37 - Populism and Backlash against International Institutions**

- \*Mudde, Cass. 2017. "Populism: An Ideational Approach." In Kaltwasser et al., eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. Oxford University Press : chapter 2.
- \*Voeten, Erik. *Forthcoming*. Populism and backlashes against international courts. *Perspectives on Politics* : 1-16.

*Highly Recommended:*

- Inglehart, Ronald F. and Norris, Pippa. 2017. "Trump and Populist-Authoritarian Parties: The Silent Revolution in Reverse," *Perspectives on Politics* 15(2): 443-454.

#### **Lecture 38 – The Future of International Institutions**

- \*Chaudoin, Stephen, Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley. 2020. "A Liberal International American Foreign Policy Under Trump? Maybe Down but Not Out." In Jervis, Robert et al., eds., *Chaos in the Liberal Order: The Trump Presidency and International Politics in the 21st Century*. Columbia University Press: 61-97;
- \*Schweller, Randall. 2020. Why Trump Now. A Third-Image Explanation. In Jervis, Robert et al., eds., *Chaos in the Liberal Order: The Trump Presidency and International Politics in the 21st Century*. Columbia University Press: 22-39.

**Lecture 39 – Content Review Class for the Long Essay**

**Lecture 40 – Team Assessment Class**

**Lecture 41 – Long Essay Review: References and Bibliography**

**Monday, June 15 – Long Essay Due**

## THEMATIC READINGS FOR THE LONG ESSAY

These are general suggestions to get you started thinking about your long essay. You shouldn't treat these materials as necessary or sufficient to think about and write the essay.

### Climate Change

- DeSombre, Elizabeth R. 2014. "Global Environmental Governance." In Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkison, eds., *International Organization and Global Governance*. London: Routledge. 580-592.
- Hoffmann, Matthew. 2014. "Climate Change." In Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkison, eds., *International Organization and Global Governance*. London: Routledge. 605-617.
- Falkner, Robert. 2016. "The Paris Agreement and the new logic of international climate politics." *International Affairs*, 92(5):1107-1125.

### Collective Security

- Williams, Paul D. and Alex Bellamy. 2014. "UN Security Council and Peace Operations." In Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkison, eds., *International Organization and Global Governance*. London: Routledge. 415-428.
- MacFarlane, Neil S. 2014. "Regional Organizations and Global Security Organization." In Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkison, eds., *International Organization and Global Governance*. London: Routledge. 429-441.
- Frieden, Jeffry A., David Lake, and Kenneth Schultz. 2009. *World Politics: Interests, Interactions, Institutions*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. Chapter 5.

### Trade

- Hoekam, Bernard. 2014. "Global Trade Governance." In Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkison, eds., *International Organization and Global Governance*. London: Routledge. 552-564.
- Frieden, Jeffry A., David Lake, and Kenneth Schultz. (2009). *World Politics: Interests, Interactions, Institutions*. W.W. Norton and Company. Chapter 6.

### Global Finance

- Momani, Bessma. (2014). "Global Finance Governance." In Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkison, eds., 2014. *International Organization and Global Governance*. London: Routledge. 539-551.
- Frieden, Jeffry A., David Lake, and Kenneth Schultz. 2009. *World Politics: Interests, Interactions, Institutions*. W.W. Norton and Company. Chapter 7 and 8.

### Human Rights

- Mertus, Julie. 2014. "Human Rights in Global Governance." In Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkison, eds., *International Organization and Global Governance*. London: Routledge. 466-476.
- Hampson, Fen Osler and Mark Raymond. 2014. "Human Security as a Global Public Good." In Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkison, eds., *International Organization and Global Governance*. London: Routledge. 524-534.

**General readings:**

- Cogan, Jacob Katz, Hurd, Ian and Johnson, Ian, eds., 2017. *The Oxford Handbook of International Organizations*. Oxford University Press.
- Karen A. Mingst and Margaret Karns. 2012. *The United Nations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. Westview Press 4<sup>th</sup> ed.
- Ngaire Woods. 2006. *The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank and their Borrowers*. Cornell University Press.