Bandwagoning for Survival: 
Political Leaders and International Alignments

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Abstract

External threats and state capacity have been at the center of the scholarly study of alignments in world politics. This article describes an alternative path to alignment between two states that is rooted in the strategic interaction between individual political leaders. We present a theory of bandwagoning for survival in which the leader in the dominant state provides side payments to help the incumbent in the secondary state survive in office in return for compliance. The theory specifies the mechanism through which leader preferences produce alignment, and alignment, in turn, generates international order. We test these ideas by checking the presence of our hypothesized mechanism in three historical cases, and by providing transparent access to detailed historic evidence to substantiate our claims.
Introduction

"If we go down", Winston Churchill wrote in a dispatch to Franklin D. Roosevelt in the summer of 1940, "you may have a United States of Europe under the Nazi command".¹ Scholars have thoroughly studied the process through which the British prime minister sought to convince the American president to commit financial and military resources to stopping Adolf Hitler. Less known, however, is the extent to which Churchill was motivated by his fear of abandonment by his own backbenchers in Parliament. Before he could concentrate on fighting for the survival of the British state, the prime minister had to secure his premiership. Churchill’s quest illustrates a recurring pattern in international political behavior: the decisions political leaders sometimes make to align their foreign policies with those of another, superior power in return for a range of side payments that help them sustain their political careers at home. But how do political rulers in secondary states bandwagon with a dominant state, and what conditions make such a choice more likely? Why do leaders in the primary state accept such openings, and how do they negotiate the terms of their engagement? How one answers these questions matters not only for understanding the international behavior of states, but also for grasping how the domestic political calculations of leaders shape the global arena.²

¹ Winston Churchill to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Telegram 1677, London, June 15, 1940, Sub-Series 1: General, BOX 1: Churchill-FDR, September 1939-1940 [vol.1]; Franklin D. Roosevelt, Papers as President: Map Room Papers (MP), 1941-1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library (FDRL).
The study of bandwagoning in world politics goes back four decades. Over time, the use of the word “bandwagoning” to describe alignment behavior has had at least three different meanings. The first regards it as a policy under which a secondary state joins a superior power to resist or oppose a major threat. In this view, states comply with the demands of a more powerful player to improve their security by either maintaining or restoring the status quo. The second view of bandwagoning argues that, under certain conditions, secondary states will bandwagon out of a sense of opportunity, not fear. When they do, they seek to accrue profits or status rather than mere security and self-preservation. The third body of work regards bandwagoning as an inevitable policy for incumbents in highly unstable developing countries who comply with the demands of a patron power in exchange for a shield against actual or


potential domestic threats. Weak states are "likely to bandwagon anyway," given that the instability inherent to their domestic politics creates powerful incentives for international alignment with a superior power. All three theories find the cause for alignment at the level of the secondary state, and assume bandwagoning is a policy a state chooses on its own. In doing so, however, they obscure important elements recurrent in bandwagoning dynamics. For instance, little is known about how the dominant state shapes decisions in the secondary state, how strategic interaction defines the terms of the exchange of goods for compliance in practice, and why some negotiations for bandwagoning fail while others succeed. If we want to better understand bandwagoning, then a theory is needed whose microfoundations account for the behavior of both the dominant and the secondary states in the dyad.

This article offers such a theory. The logic of bandwagoning for survival presented in this article pulls together different strands of scholarship, including security studies, foreign policy and diplomacy, and comparative politics. We take bandwagoning to mean the exchange of side payments for compliance and we argue that alignment results from the strategic interaction between two individual actors: an incumbent in a secondary state whose survival in office is under

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actual or potential threat and a leader in a primary state who has a geostrategic stake in that incumbent’s ability to retain power. Alignment occurs when these two leaders opt to instrumentally use their foreign policies to generate new resources to strengthen the power of the incumbent in the secondary state and to fulfill the geostrategic preferences of the leader in the primary state. In the process, they trade side payments for compliance. This is a domestic-politics variant of the phenomenon recurrent in hierarchical systems, whereby the exchange of “protection for compliance [...] is in the interest of both dominant and subordinate states”.

Negotiations within the bandwagoning dyad are rife with tension due to the problems inherent in strategic interactions – the simultaneous challenges of signaling, commitment, and bargaining. A failure to overcome these problems will disrupt the process of alignment, weakening the domestic standing of the incumbent in the secondary state, increasing the geopolitical risks faced by the leader in the primary state, and possibly raising audience costs for both. By contrast, success in managing the problems inherent in strategic interaction will lead to a bandwagoning equilibrium, defined as a situation in which neither ruler has an incentive to unilaterally abandon the deal. When it succeeds, bandwagoning can temporarily strengthen leaders’ relative stance vis-à-vis challengers and enemies at home and abroad, opening opportunities for the two leaders in the dyad to consolidate their advantage. By extending rulers’ time horizons, bandwagoning can also create incentives on both sides to invest further in increasing the capacity of the

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7 David Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009). With this theory we seek to further specify Lake’s work on the relational exercise of authority by dominant states that provide protections in exchange for compliance from secondary state by bringing the role of domestic politics to bear.
bilateral relationship. In the process, bandwagoning dynamics help create international order.

The remainder of this article is divided into five sections. The second section, present the theory, its microfoundations, and its causal mechanism. The third section explains the research design, including an assessment of the measures and data for empirical analysis. The fourth section offers an empirical test of three historical cases, in which process tracing shows the hypothesized causal mechanism at play. The primary evidence the informs the cases is made available in ways that allow other scholars to assess the appropriateness of our inferences. We then offer a discussion of our empirical results and conclude be presenting scholarly and policy implications of this work.

A Theory of Bandwagoning for Survival

According to this theory, bandwagoning is the outcome of an exchange of goods for compliance between two political rulers: one has a stake in the survival of another whose tenure in power is under threat. Compliance serves the geostrategic interests of the dominant state, while the provision of goods helps defray the costs of securing domestic political support for the incumbent whose political future is uncertain. Bandwagoning will succeed if and when the two leaders overcome the challenges of mutual signaling, commitment, and bargaining. When either side fails to deliver on its side of the deal, it runs the risk of abandonment by the other side. For the leader in the dominant state, this may compromise geostrategic interests. For the incumbent in the secondary state, it may reduce the odds of retaining office. Our theory therefore challenges the view

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common in the previous scholarship that sees bandwagoning as a choice by one state in its relations with a superior power. Here, bandwagoning is an interactive process, not an self-standing option on the policy menu of a single state.

The probability of bandwagoning therefore depends on three interconnected factors. First, the leader in the dominant state has the ability to credibly commit to providing side payments to the secondary state. This ability hinges on the geopolitical salience of the secondary state. Second, the incumbent in the secondary state needs externally provided goods to lock in domestic support. Incumbents who feel safe in their positions will find little incentive to align their foreign policies with those of a dominant state. The larger the threat from potential challengers, the greater the value of external alignment with the superior power. Third, bandwagoning depends on the capacity of the ruler in the secondary state to comply with the dominant-power’s demands in the face of audience costs.

The theory rests on three assumptions. First, we assume incumbents act rationally: they make purposive decisions that take reasonable account of their own interests, the international constraints surrounding them, and the opportunities they face. Second, political leaders survive in office by retaining the support of a winning coalition: the minimum number of citizens they need to satisfy and keep clear of the reach of actual or potential challengers. Third, we assume leaders in a dyad have imperfect information about each other’s preferences, no matter how close or intimate they might

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be. Diplomatic strategy in such a context results from actor beliefs about what the other side wants, from their surrounding strategic environment, and from leader interaction over time.

Let us now look at each component of the theory in turn.

LEADER PREFERENCES IN THE DOMINANT STATE. The leader in a dominant state will assist in the domestic political survival of a fellow incumbent by helping her win wars, suppress rebellions, stabilize the national economy, provide development aid, offer credit and foreign investment, etc. Leaders come out in support of their fellow leaders when the benefits of such assistance are larger than the costs incurred. In the everyday practice of foreign-policy alignment, there are at least five types of costs for the leader in the dominant state. The most obvious is the provision of military assistance. Another is the cost of alienating third-party relationships that the dominant state might want to keep in good stead. The leader will incur a third type of cost if she applies pressure on international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to bend over backwards to deliver finance and credit to the secondary state that would otherwise not be forthcoming. Fourth, the leader in the dominant state may incur a reputational cost: as she commits to supporting her counterpart in the secondary state, rulers elsewhere draw

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11 Lake and Powell, "International Relations," p.11. For the argument that communication is more precise between actors who preferences are closely aligned, see Vincent Crawford and Joel Sobel, Strategic Information Transmission. *Econometrica*, Vol 50, No. 6, (1982), pp.1431-51.  
12 Lake, "Legitimating Power: The Domestic Politics of US International Hierarchy".  
inferences about her ability to live up to her promises.\textsuperscript{15} Fifth, there are potential audience costs if the leader fails to deliver on her commitment to supporting her fellow incumbent or if domestic audiences are unwilling to shoulder the cost of making the side payments.\textsuperscript{16}

LEADER PREFERENCES IN THE SECONDARY STATE. Rulers in secondary states will seek to bandwagon when compliance is rewarded with the material and intangible resources they need to seal the support of their domestic winning coalitions. Because domestic challengers are more likely to be deterred from launching an attack against a sitting chief executive who enjoys the support of a dominant power, bandwagoning becomes a desirable behavior. Raising credible charges against an incumbent who enjoys a bandwagoning arrangement with a dominant state may not be impossible, but it surely increases the costs involved. Following selectorate theory, the size of the winning coalition will determine what types of goods the incumbent needs to stay in office. Large winning coalitions incentivize incumbents to provide public goods such as winning a war or producing economic stability, low inflation, and high employment. By contrast, small winning coalitions incentivize incumbents to generate private goods for coalition members, such as plum positions in state-owned companies, opportunities for rent-seeking and corruption, trade policies that benefit friendly interest groups, exclusive access to credit, etc.\textsuperscript{17} Knowing whether the


\textsuperscript{17} Bueno de Mesquita et al, \textit{The Logical of Political Survival}, p.38-41.
side payments provided by the dominant state will be public or private in each specific case is a matter of empirical evaluation, as recent literatures have shown with regard to foreign aid,\textsuperscript{18} loans by the IMF\textsuperscript{19} the World Bank,\textsuperscript{20} and contracts to use military bases.\textsuperscript{21}

Rulers in secondary states will normally bandwagon only after they exhaust other domestic options. After all, in order to extract side payments from the dominant state, the incumbent in the secondary state has to comply with its costly demands. Her space to conduct foreign policy shrinks, as she is no longer able to entertain the policy options that she might have otherwise pursued, and she must adopt policies that she would not normally choose in the absence of the perceived need to bandwagon. The cost of alignment will vary: the shorter the distance between the policy preferences of the dominant and the secondary states, the smaller the costs incurred by the subordinate state; the farther the ideal point of the incumbent is from that of the dominant state, the bigger the costs the subordinate ruler has to defray in the act of compliance.


Incumbents in secondary states who bandwagon may also face audience costs: few decisions do more to shape incumbent reputation than the type of diplomatic relationship political leaders establish with a dominant state. Alignment with a more powerful state may dangerously alienate public opinion. In order to bandwagon, incumbents in secondary states therefore need to believe that the net benefits offered by the primary state outweigh the loss of policy autonomy and the myriad costs involved.

**BANDWAGONING DYNAMICS.** In strategic interactions, actors are uncertain about each other’s preferences and have powerful incentives to exploit this uncertainty in their favor. Unsurprisingly, when they try to hammer out the terms of foreign-policy alignment, leaders in a dyad confront three types of problems: signaling, commitment, and bargaining. Signaling is the mechanism through which one actor communicates her motivations to another who is unaware of them. Since no actor can ever be completely sure of the true intentions of the other, the strategic logic of signaling requires that each one draw inferences from the other’s actions. The effectiveness of signals depends on how credible they are. Commitment problems occur when actors fail to make credible promises or credible threats. Actors can overcome this problem by offering a commitment device – typically an institutional innovation that changes payoffs so as to make otherwise empty threats or promises credible. In the context of bandwagoning dynamics, commitment

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22 Renshon, Dafoe and Huth, "Leader Influence and Reputation Formation in World Politics."

23 James D. Morrow, "The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in international politics", in Lake and Powell, eds., Strategic Choice and International Relations, pp. 77-114.


25 Robert Trager, Diplomacy: Communication and the Origins of International Order (Cambridge University Press, 2017); Brett Ashley Leeds, "Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International
devices for the dominant state may include formal diplomatic agreements or the successful passing of bills to adapt domestic legislation to the requirements of the other state in the dyad. For the secondary state, commitment devices may include joining global institutions or adopting international norms created by the dominant state, muting or diluting criticism of dominant-state action, or supporting and galvanizing third-party support for the grand strategies of the dominant state.²⁶ Such devices allow leaders in the dyad to show one another that their expressed commitments to alignment are not merely cheap talk.

The bargaining problem in bandwagoning dynamics refers to how the two states in the dyad distribute the costs and benefits that their alignment can generate. The two rulers may agree on the general utility of alignment but be unable to reach a final agreement on the specific terms of their cooperation. The differing distributive preferences within the dyad generate a situation of latent conflict between its members. To complicate things further, neither side knows for sure how much the other is willing to pay in order to secure cooperation, and no agreement may be imposed on the weaker party without its consent. Another challenge to bandwagoning negotiations is that both sides have incentives to misrepresent their respective bottom lines in order to gain leverage in the bargaining process. As they seek to strike a deal, each party weighs the benefits of asking for a more favorable deal for itself against the risks that the other will reject that offer as unacceptable. As in all negotiations, persuasion plays a major role, in particular when one side seeks to convince the other of the importance of the deal. Key in unfolding an alignment bargain is each actor's reservation level: its threshold for deciding to make the deal.

²⁶ David Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations, cap. 4.
An actor’s reservation level depends on outside options - the alternatives to a negotiated agreement. When actors have outside options, they use them to secure a better deal. This makes members of some dyads more patient than others in negotiating the terms of bandwagoning, as those who have outside options are in a better position to bargain than those operating under less favorable conditions. In bandwagoning dynamics, the fact that both members in the dyad prefer to align their foreign policies does not predetermine the outcome of their bargain. And because neither resolve nor capabilities alone settle the problems of strategic interaction, the dominant state will not always prevail. By the same token, the willingness of the incumbent in the secondary state will not in itself suffice to bring about alignment. Bandwagoning is not a policy one state can achieve on its own. Rather, it is the outcome of an interactive process between two rulers with differing preferences.

The theory’s causal mechanism. The bandwagoning-for-survival theory can be broken down into a set of interacting parts that transmit causal force from the independent variable (the preferences of the two leaders in the dyad) and the observable outcome (the occurrence of foreign-policy alignment). In order to visually express the agency by which the effect is produced, the figure below identifies the parts of the mechanism that are necessary to generate bandwagoning. Here we concentrate only on the systematic parts of the mechanism that generate causal effect beyond any particular case. The graphic representation of the mechanism also shows that the mere presence of underlying causes does not make foreign-policy alignment in a dyad inevitable. For bandwagoning to occur, catalysts that are independent of the underlying causes may have to be present.

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The mechanism can be broken down as follows: X is composed of the preferences of the two leaders in the dyad. Y is the resultant foreign-policy alignment. The bandwagoning-for-survival causal mechanism we conceptualize is composed of three interlocking parts (signaling, commitment, and bargaining), each of which is individually insufficient but necessary for the mechanism to produce its outcome. The scope conditions under which the mechanism is theorized to work are (a) the leader in the dominant state needs to believe her country’s global standing will be negatively affected if the incumbent in the secondary state loses office (b) the incumbent in the secondary state needs to believe she cannot muster the necessary goods to keep her winning coalition by her side without her support of the dominant state. Framing the mechanism in such a way establishes that the predicted empirical manifestations of our theory will be best studied at the level of individual leaders.

Research Design
We test the presence/absence of the theorized mechanism through three single-case studies. For each case, we specify the chronology of events that are predicted to unfold according to the causal mechanism, from beginning to end: inception (when the two sides initially signal their intention to align and begin to commit to each other); bargaining (when actors split the cost and benefits of their alignment); equilibrium (when they reach a deal that neither side has an incentive to abandon unilaterally). This division is somewhat artificial, in the sense that signaling, commitment, and bargaining processes can occur simultaneously. But, analytically distinguishing between phases – inception, bargaining, and equilibrium – usefully frames alignment dynamics as a finite interaction featuring a beginning, a middle, and an end in which each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but entirely component as a component of the whole. We detail each case on the back of primary evidence that speaks to the motivations, strategies, information, and beliefs held by political leaders in the bandwagoning dyad. With a view to facilitate replication, we make primary sources for each case available online (see Supplementary Materials below).28

There are limitations to this research design. Showing how the various parts of the hypothesized causal mechanism are present in a given case enables a series of causal inferences about whether the mechanism functions as expected. What this research design does not allow for, however, is any claims about whether the mechanism was the only cause of the outcome in each case.29


Furthermore, assessing causation with a small N does not allow for generalization about typical effects for a large population. In the concluding section, we consider how the theoretical argument presented here can be nested in a broader research design in the future that will allow for generalization based on our sample.

Case selection comprises two historical instances of bandwagoning for survival with most similar factors contributing to their outcome, namely President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in the early 1940s, and President Gerald Ford and Prince Juan Carlos of Spain in the 1970s. The outcome of the cases, namely that of John F. Kennedy and João Goulart of Brazil in the 1960s, differs from those of the other two as a result of the causal mechanism unraveling during the bargaining phase. Each of the three cases presents supportive evidence of the theory's predictions and contributes to increasing confidence in the mechanism through which causal factors are hypothesized to affect the outcome. The availability of official telegrams, private letters, memoirs, and other primary sources detailing negotiations within each dyad allows us to closely examine the entities and dynamics behind bandwagoning over time and place.

Empirical Tests

Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill
May 1940 – August 1941

On 10 May, 1940, King George VI asked Winston Churchill to form a new government. Earlier that day, Adolf Hitler had attacked the Western Front, consolidating his control over Austria,

Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Norway, and Poland. Most observers at the time expected the Churchill ministry to be short-lived because, like Neville Chamberlain before him, Churchill would be able to retain support from his own backbenchers in Parliament only as long as British troops held the line against the Wehrmacht. In the event of additional losses against German positions, the British cabinet would in all likelihood declare Churchill unfit to lead. But the prime minister's position was frail for other reasons too. The Conservative Party denied him party leadership, and the wartime "national unity" government required he shared power with Labour. To make matters worse, that Parliament was elected in 1935 on a platform that opposed British involvement in yet another war, but Churchill rose garnering on a reputation for denouncing Nazi Germany, not negotiating with it. Furthermore, there were no prospects of a general election until the end of the war, preventing the prime minister from calling a snap election to seek a popular mandate. And there were potential challengers as well. Some pointed to Lloyd George - the old prime minister from the World War I - but most considered Lord Halifax, the foreign secretary, to be the preferred candidate to unseat Churchill. Halifax in particular was seen as both willing and able to secure a peace deal with Hitler, thus avoiding any military confrontation on British territory likely to produce a humiliating defeat involving mass civilian casualties. The secretary had the reputation, skills, and networks, including the sympathy of the king and the queen, to take over the premiership. As he took office in May 1940, Churchill was desperate for military

31 Roberts, The Holy Fox, p. 49.
victories that would signal to Parliament that his was a viable premiership. But from the House of Commons to the British Chiefs of Staff, everyone knew he would need US support. The German threat to the Churchill premiership was more immediate than the threat it posed to the very existence of the British state.

Since September 1938, Roosevelt had been concerned with Hitler’s presence in the Atlantic and with German plans for naval control in Central and South America. He expected the European powers to hold the line against the Wehrmacht, but he was not prepared to pay too high a cost to empower them to do so. Not only did Congress have no appetite for a military intervention in Europe, but also – this is crucial – the president would be seeking an unprecedented third term in November 1940. Things changed when France fell around the time of Churchill’s inauguration. A Nazi victory in Europe could have entailed a German takeover of the defeated fleets, which Hitler could have turned against the Western Hemisphere. Referring to Great Britain, the US ambassador in London Joseph P. Kennedy stated that United States should concentrate on defending the Western Hemisphere “rather than frittering away its scarce resources on an unreliable client across the Atlantic”. Roosevelt was not willing to come out in support of Britain, but he did want reassurance that, in event of its defeat, the British fleet would not fall into the Hitler’s hands.


35 Kennedy to Hull, Telegram 2535, Washington, August 2, 1940, State Department Decimal File (CFCF), 740.0011 EW 1939/4929 3-4, Record Group 59, National Archives (NARA). Quoted in Reynolds, From World War to Cold War, p. 149.
INCEPTION. “As you are no doubt aware,” Churchill wrote the president five days after taking office, “the scene has darkened swiftly”.36 The prime minister went on to make a string of remarkable requests. He wanted to borrow forty to fifty of America’s older destroyers, several hundred aircraft, and anti-aircraft equipment and ammunition, as well US steel. He also wanted reassurance from the president that “when we can pay no more, you will give us the stuff all the same.” And last but not least, he wanted the president “to keep that Japanese dog quiet in the Pacific, using Singapore [then a British colony] in any way convenient.”37 Roosevelt turned down Churchill’s demands.38 But five days later, on May 20, 1940, the prime minister insisted by appealing to Roosevelt’s geostrategic interests. “If members of the present [British] administration were finished and others came in to parley amid the ruins, you must not be blind to the fact that the sole remaining bargaining counter with Germany would be the [British] fleet, and if this country was left by the United States to its fate, no one would have the right to blame those then responsible if they made the best terms they could for the surviving inhabitants.”39 Roosevelt understood the stakes and was ready to make some concessions, but he wanted the British to firmly commit to the promise that, in the event they be defeated, the Royal Navy would sail to Canada to avoid failing under German control and the royal family be removed to Bermuda

36 Churchill to Roosevelt, Telegram 1216, London, May 15, 1940, Sub-Series 1: General, BOX 1: Churchill-FDR, September 1939-1940 [vol.1]; Franklin D. Roosevelt, Papers as President: MF, 1941-1945, FDRL.
39 Churchill to Roosevelt, Telegram 1271, London, May 20, 1940, Sub-Series 1: General, BOX 1: Churchill-FDR, September 1939-1940 [vol.1]; Franklin D. Roosevelt, Papers as President: (MF), 1941-1945, FDRL.
- but not to the United States, since "the American republics may be restless at monarchy being based in the American continent". 40

Churchill was furious, 41 and the two leaders stopped communicating with one another for a month. Accounts of mutual suspicion and fears of abandonment between the president and prime minister at the time dominate private memoirs and other accounts. 42 The diplomatic relationship was in bad shape as well, with recurring disagreement over trade, decolonization, World War I debts, naval competition, the Manchurian crisis, and the management of the global economy after the Depression. As noted by Sir Alexander Cadogan, the top civil servant in the British Foreign Office, "I am afraid that, taught by experience, I have little faith in America". 43

But mounting German pressure from across the English Channel provided an opening. Between May 26 and June 4, 1940, the Royal Navy and British civilians in private ships evacuated thousands of soldiers that had been cornered by German forces in the seaport of Dunkirk. Some 340,000 men were rescued in an operation involving 861 vessels, 243 of which were sunk. "We shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be," Churchill said in an

40 The Marques of Lothian, Washington, May 26, 1940, CAB 65/13, WP (40) 142 (Appendix) TNA.
41 Quoted in Lukacs, Five Days in London, p.143-144.
emotional speech broadcast from Parliament. “We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing-ground, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender.” The events at Dunkirk changed the strategic setting, making Roosevelt reconsider his original position.

BARGAINING On June 10, 1940, Roosevelt for the first time publicly said the United States would materially assist those struggling against the Axis. Yet, in a series of exchanges with Churchill between June 12-15, the president did not grant the prime minister what he needed – a public commitment to US military assistance to the British. Churchill was exasperated, and his opponents in Parliament began to openly ask for a negotiated peace with Germany. US Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau understood the stakes. “Unless we do something to give the English additional destroyers,” he wrote to the president, “it seems to me it is absolutely hopeless to expect them to keep going.” On June 17, word reached Washington that Foreign Secretary Halifax might imminently replace Churchill as head of government. Two days later, on June 19, Hitler made the British government a peace offer. When Churchill turned it down, the Führer ordered preparations for a war against Russia, on the argument that if the Soviets were to be crippled, England's last hope would vanish. Nobody in Berlin expected Roosevelt to actually come to Britain’s rescue.

44 Winston Churchill, “Prime Minister’s Statement before House of Commons, 4th June 1940”, available online at: https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1940-the-finest-hour/we-shall-fight-on-the-beaches.
45 Churchill to Roosevelt, Telegram 1677, London, June 15, 1940, Sub-Series 1: General, BOX 1: Churchill-FDR, September 1939-1940 [vol.1]; Franklin D. Roosevelt, Papers as President: MP, 1941-1945, FDRL. See also Reynolds, Competitive Co-operation, chap. 4.
46 Morgenthau to Roosevelt, Memorandum for the President, Washington, June 18, 1940, Sub-Series 1: General, BOX 1: Churchill-DFR, September 1939-1940 [vol.1]; Franklin D. Roosevelt, Papers as President: MP, 1941-1945, FDRL.
That very same day, however, Roosevelt began meeting some of Churchill’s requests related to small arms and ammunitions, and the purchase of aircraft. The president insisted on his own demands. On August 12, 1940, Roosevelt asked that in the event of a German conquest of England, the British be firmly committed to sailing their naval fleet to ports in the United States and Canada, neither surrendering the fleet to the Germans nor destroying it. He also wanted a formal commitment from Churchill that US forces would be authorized to use Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Trinidad, and British Guiana as naval and air bases in the event of an attack on the Western hemisphere by any extra-regional nation. He also required that “in the meantime the United States … have the right to establish such bases and … use them for training and exercise purposes” by means of “purchase or through a 99-year lease.”

Churchill was ready to acquiesce, but first he had to mute opposition to the deal in Westminster, where critics were bound to chastise him for surrendering the empire to the Americans. On August 20, in presenting to the House of Commons with the proposal for the leasing of bases, the prime minister portrayed it as a spontaneous offer rather than a deal. And he privately asked Roosevelt to frame the offer of US destroyers as an “entirely separate spontaneous act”, not a trade for the bases. However, Roosevelt could not deliver on this particular request as a wave of anti-interventionist sentiment in the run-up to the November elections would be disastrous for his electoral prospects. To make things worse, US law prevented him from

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legally giving the British the destroyers or any other military equipment unless the military chiefs certified the material as an exchange in the national interest.

But Churchill insisted that British compliance not be portrayed as submission. "Your commitment is definite," wrote the prime minister to Roosevelt, "ours unlimited." He continues, "If your law or your Admiral require that any help you may choose to give us must be presented as a quid pro quo, I do not see why the British Government have to come into that at all."51 At this stage, Roosevelt backtracked, and State Department lawyers drafted a compromise proposal. On September 2, 1940, one year after Britain had gone to war with Germany, Roosevelt publicly announced the transfer of fifty old destroyers to Britain in what amounted to a drastic departure from the president's previous posture. In exchange, the prime minister pledged that the British fleet would never be surrendered.52 Wendell Willkie, the Republican candidate for president in the 1940 election, chastised Roosevelt for not working on the agreement through Congress but came out in support of the destroyers-for-bases agreement.53

Five days later, on September 7, Hitler ordered the bombing of London. But empowered by Roosevelt's support, Churchill went on the offensive not only against Germany, but also against his enemies at home. By November, Halifax had been removed from the cabinet and sent away as British ambassador to Washington. Assessing the British political scene in January 1941, presidential adviser Harry Hopkins reported this: "I cannot emphasize too strongly that [Churchill] is the one and only person over here with whom you need to have a full meeting of

51 Churchill to Roosevelt, London, August 25, 1940, Sub-Series 1: General, BOX 1: Churchill-FDR, September 1939-1940 [vol.1]; Franklin D. Roosevelt, Papers as President: MP, 1941-1945, FDRL.
52 Kimball (ed.), Churchill and Roosevelt, p.69.
53 Kimball (ed.), Churchill and Roosevelt, p.68.
minds".  

EQUILIBRIUM. After re-election, Roosevelt doubled down on his commitment to Britain: between January and March 1941 the president fought one of the longest legislative struggles of his presidency over the Lend-Lease Act, whereby a still-neutral United States committed to shipping essential goods and materials to a cash-stripped Britain without need for immediate payment. In the war years leading to 1945, the Lend-Lease policy would eventually cover 54 percent of the British balance-of-payments deficits. Both the president and the prime minister had committed to aligning their foreign policies. Now they needed to distribute the costs and benefits that would accrue.

In the course of five days, starting on the Augusta on August 9, 1941 in Placentia Bay, Roosevelt and Churchill struggled to come up with an agreement they both could swallow. The prime minister wanted to retain imperial trade preferences and lay the foundation for a postwar settlement that would grant Britain significant authority worldwide. He also wanted a public statement that the two leaders had indeed discussed war aims—even if the United States remained neutral. By contrast, the US delegation wanted to abolish imperial trade tariffs, keep clear of any postwar arrangement that might resemble the League of Nations, keep private any talk of war aims private, and eliminate the possibility of any separate peace accord between Britain and the Soviet Union.  

By the end of their week together, the president and the prime minister had produced a formal Charter institutionalizing their alignment.

After Placentia Bay, Churchill told his ministers that "he now felt convinced Roosevelt would do all he could to help in war and consolidate the peace."\(^{56}\) The equilibrium they negotiated lasted four months and formed the basis for even-closer ties later. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the domestic constraints on Roosevelt loosened, the United States formally entered the war, and British-US bandwagoning gave way to a full-fledged alliance. Thus, to say that "Anglo-American cooperation [during World War II] grew out of a sense of shared threat and mutual need,"\(^{57}\) is correct but underspecified. The foreign-policy alignment between Roosevelt and Churchill began well before the two leaders united as allies. It started in the summer of 1940, spurred by a shared Churchill’s sense of peril in the domestic battles of Westminster and the repercussions his fall from power might have on the wider geostrategic interests of the United States.

**Henry Kissinger and Prince Juan Carlos of Spain**

**November 1975 to July 1976**

As he approached the age of 80 and his health weakened, Generalissimo Francisco Franco set a framework for his succession by handpicking 30-year old Prince Juan Carlos as his political heir. In choosing the prince in 1969, Franco hoped to quell pro-liberalization protests on the left, attend to demands to restore the monarchy on the right, and mitigate pressure from the European Community – in particular Germany – to transition


\(^{57}\) Reynolds, *From World War to Cold War,* p. 69.
to democracy. Franco anointed the prince as his successor on the understanding that the monarch would keep Franco’s longtime winning coalition intact: the Movimiento Nacional, a network of conservative power brokers including the Falange Española (the country’s only political party), the trade union Sindicato Vertical, and civil-servant unions. For the first five years after his appointment as successor, the young prince played the part, appearing next to Franco at public functions and celebrations and speaking favorably of the dictator and the authoritarian regime. But as Franco’s health deteriorated in the early 1970s, Juan Carlos began to plot a peaceful, negotiated transition that would deliver regime change. In the process, the prince secretly reached out to Spanish political leaders in exile and in opposition, as well as foreign heads of government. To dismantle the authoritarian regime and install a modern European democratic system in its place, the prince wanted to introduce a constitutional monarchy capable of securing the centrality of the crown while giving the Spanish people the vote.58 But Juan Carlos knew that any change could trigger a backlash from Franco’s supporters and from the military. Radical progressive movements were erupting across southern Europe at the time, with Christian Democrats in Italy rolling out left-leaning legislation and Portugal embroiled in the 1974 Revolution of the Carnations.59 The Spanish economy was in tatters as the oil shock made inflation climb to 26 percent and prompted a wave of labor unrest amid a period of stagflation, and terrorist activity kept the old regime’s political class on

58 Charles Powell, El amigo americano. España y Estados Unidos: de la dictadura a la democracia (Galaxia Gutenber/Círculo de Lectores, 2011).
edge.\textsuperscript{60} The prince needed resources to persuade the military to buy into his transition agenda.

The US government had been worried about Franco’s succession for years, concluding that stability in the long term would depend on rooting Spain firmly within the Euro-Atlantic space, that is, through its joining NATO.\textsuperscript{61} For this, however, Spain would first have to transition from authoritarian rule.\textsuperscript{62} From a US perspective, change would be hard to engineer in practice.\textsuperscript{63} Successive administrations since Dwight D. Eisenhower’s had supported Franco’s regime in power in exchange for access and use of four military bases in the Spanish territory. Any transition would have to secure possession of the bases, which were fully funded by the United States but operated by a Spanish rear admiral. The Rota Naval Station in the province of Cádiz was the most relevant. Strategically located at the halfway point between the United States and Southwest Asia, it provided support to US Sixth Fleet units in the Mediterranean and to US Air Force Air Mobility Command. It also offered cargo, fuel, and ammunition to US and NATO ships. But the agreement governing US military bases was up for renewal in 1976, and the US government


feared a popular backlash in Spain. After all, in 1974, Greece had withdrawn from NATO’s integrated military structure, and in July 1975, Turkey would opt to suspend all bilateral defense agreements with the United States. When it came to Spain, securing the military bases as the country transitioned to democracy became the top priority. Kissinger feared that radical upheaval on the streets would kick the door open to a resurgent Spanish Communist Party, which would then spur trouble for the US military presence in Spain. He thought the best recipe for steering the country away from the leftward drift of Portugal and Italy would be a US-led backing of Juan Carlos, who was struggling to form a winning coalition of his own.\(^{64}\)

INCEPTION. Although leaders in the European Community were sympathetic to the prince, they were also unconvinced the inexperienced monarch would be able to deliver an effective transition from authoritarian rule. In their talks with Juan Carlos, they insisted that the Spanish Communist Party be brought out of illegality to compete freely for the popular vote.\(^{65}\) Juan Carlos feared that if he agreed to that, he would face a massive backlash from conservative forces. On October 30, 1975, Franco granted Juan Carlos full control; the former died three weeks later. According to Kissinger, the prince represented “the only institutional guarantee that there will


be stability and progress". On November 22, 1975, two days after Franco’s death, the Spanish parliament proclaimed Juan Carlos king of Spain. In order to retain his throne, the US embassy in Madrid concluded the he “will need all the support he can get.”

BARGAINING. In November 1975, Juan Carlos sent emissaries to Washington with a series of requests: he wanted the US president to attend his inauguration as King the following year, and he wanted to renegotiate the terms of the agreement on the US occupied bases in Spain. More specifically, Juan Carlos hoped he could get a bigger military-aid package, a bigger role for Spain within NATO, and the elevation of the base agreement to the status of a full-fledged international treaty sanctioned by the US Senate. In the prince’s mind, these would be the strongest signals the United States could possibly send to the world as to its belief in the legitimacy of the new Spanish regime. Juan Carlos put forward his requests with an eye on his domestic audience. He wanted the United States to withdraw existing nuclear submarines from the Rota base, and he wanted US military personnel to work at the base under tighter legal constraints. Crucially, Juan Carlos wanted a formal security guarantee: in the event of an attack, the United States would come to Spain’s rescue.

68 Conversation between General Scowcroft and the Secretary, Telcon at 12.20 pm, November 4, 1975, and Telcon, 1.07 pm, November 4, 1975. National Security Adviser: NSC Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs Staff Files, Box 6, Gerald R. Ford Library. Quoted in Powell, El amigo americano.
Kissinger was determined to engage the prince because if Spain turned left, it would hurt US Cold War interests in Europe and create a doubt on future of the Rota base. Kissinger, however, would come out in full support of the crown only in exchange for Spanish compliance: turning a blind eye to nagging demands from the European leadership. Rather than legalize the Communist Party immediately, Kissinger preferred Spain to defer that decision to some undetermined point in the future. If the White House was going to pay the cost of elevating the base agreement to the status of an international treaty, then the Ford administration wanted to see Spain under the crown become a loyal partner in fighting the rise of the European left.

Negotiations were tense. Kissinger told the Spanish from the outset that he could not guarantee Senate approval of the bases treaty and that they might have to settle for a less. He also turned down requests from the crown that existing aid package to Spain be elevated from $675 million to $1 billion. Kissinger worried that granting Juan Carlos the sum he wanted would prompt other US partners to emulate the prince and ask for more. Kissinger also turned down proposals regarding for changing the legal standing of US personnel at the bases and refused to consider a formal security guarantee. When the prince’s representatives insisted on removal of submarines from Rota, US negotiators believed this to be a ploy aimed at extracting greater concessions, and they were correct.

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71 Powell, El amigo Americano, p.308-09.
The terms of the bandwagoning arrangement between Spain and the United States took shape in late 1975. President Ford did not attend the proclamation himself; sending Vice President Nelson Rockefeller in his place.\(^74\) On January 24, 1976, Kissinger signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Madrid that sealed the fate of the Rota base. US concessions to Spanish demands were manifold: the United States would withdraw its nuclear submarines from Rota on the king’s preferred calendar,\(^75\) the US military presence at the base would also follow tighter Spanish controls, and Ford would submit the text of the agreement to the Senate for approval. In the words of the Spanish foreign minister, the treaty was an “excellent gift for the Monarchy.” Kissinger turned down the demand for a security guarantee, but reassured the Spanish public: “The political importance that we attach to our relationship with Spain”, he said during a press conference, “is reflected in this treaty and would be a major factor in our decisions, whatever the legal obligations.”\(^76\)

EQUILIBRIUM. In June 1976, Juan Carlos landed in Washington for his first state visit. He addressed a joint session of Congress and presented his vision of a Western-style parliamentary
monarchy. No Western European capital would have him speak before an entire cabinet.\textsuperscript{77} A New York Times editorial hailed him the “King for Democracy,”\textsuperscript{78} while the State Department drafted a telegram under the title “Mission accomplished.”\textsuperscript{79} The Senate approved the treaty within a month, and upon the new king’s return home, his cabinet announced foreign credits to the tune of $1 billion by an international consortium led by US banks, on top of an IMF loan worth $340 million.\textsuperscript{80}

Secure in his new position as king, Juan Carlos rolled out an ambitious plan for regime liberalization. In 1976 he passed a Law for Political Reform, sacked conservative prime minister Carlos Arias Navarro, and legalized both the Communist Party of Spain and the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party. In 1978 a democratically elected parliament promulgated a new constitution acknowledging Juan Carlos as “the legitimate heir of the historic dynasty” (rather than as Franco’s designated successor). Since the Spain has lived under a Constitutional monarchy.


John F. Kennedy and João Goulart of Brazil  
April-December 1962

When Brazil’s sitting president resigned on August 25, 1961, Vice President João Goulart was next in the line of succession. Officers in the Brazilian military—de facto political veto players—feared Goulart might ignite socialist radicalism just two years after the Cuban Revolution. The military agreed to let Goulart take the oath of office only after curbing presidential powers by creating the position of a prime minister to be chosen by Congress. Goulart agreed to this, on the proviso that the new semiparliamentary system would be put to a vote by popular referendum one year later. From the outset, Goulart’s odds of surviving in office depended on his performance during the first year. But the deck was stacked against him. In a fragmented legislature of several parties, the president was in a minority position to implement his progressive agenda of universal suffrage, labor protections, land redistribution and welfare provision. Washington officials viewed these policies as positive in a country that had seen too little social justice. Congress was far more socially conservative than the president, and the deputados of the Chamber of Deputies set out to increase public spending even if the country was sliding into recession, with inflation running at 50% a month. Ultimately, Goulart would need outside support in order to demonstrate strong performance during his first year in office (and pave the way for the restoration of full presidential powers).81

The John F. Kennedy administration mistrusted Goulart from the outset but also felt there was too much at stake in Brazil to

alienate the new president. The White House was particularly wary of the growing influence of the *Ligas Camponesas* (Peasant Leagues), which helped organize citizens in one of the poorest regions of South America to resist land eviction and demand civil and political rights in the countryside. Upheaval in that part of the world could trigger revolution, and the administration in Washington was not prepared to accept another Cuba in Latin America. As presidential adviser Richard Goodwin wrote in February 1962, “We have no choice but to work to strengthen this government [...] since there appears to be no viable alternative.”

The expectation at the time was that Goulart was no radical ideologue, but someone with whom the administration could do business with.

White House perceptions of Goulart were deeply influenced by domestic US politics. Kennedy had narrowly won the 1960 election against Richard Nixon by staking out foreign-policy positions that were more hawkish than the Republican Party’s. Building up strong anti-Communist credentials was critical to the success of the new Kennedy administration – and to securing the support of the key Democratic senators and congressional representatives of the Southern states who controlled congressional committees. Toward that end, Kennedy relied on the reputation of his younger brother US Attorney General Robert “Bobby” Kennedy, as a rabidly anticommunist Democrat who had a decade earlier served as an adviser to Senator Joseph McCarthy in the witch hunt for communists, homosexuals and other “subversives.” Within such a domestic context, the president’s flexibility to accommodate someone with Goulart’s reputation as a man of the left was limited. After all, any signals coming out of the White House that the United States might be propping up a socialist leader in Latin America would give powerful ammunition to Kennedy’s

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82 Goodwin to Bundy, February 7, 1962, Brazil, Box 12, National Security Files (NSF), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library (JFKL).
opponents, who in April 1961 had seen the president botch the invasion at the Bay of Pigs. Extending an open hand to Goulart was a risky maneuver. A clenched fist, however, could radicalize him. Kennedy set out to try to engage Goulart.

INCEPTION. The US president sent his first signal to Brazil in April 1962 by offering economic assistance in exchange for a purge of leftist politicians from the Goulart cabinet and other key positions in Brazilian government. Goulart, however, had serious reservations about Kennedy’s offer. Getting too close to the United States would be toxic for his base, which included the various strands of the Brazilian left and nationalists in the military and in the industrial sector, student organizations, and labor unions. Furthermore, delivering on US demands was difficult for a reformist president whose powers had been curtailed. His first parliamentary cabinet only lasted nine-and-a-half months, and when Goulart put forward a close associate as candidate for the premiership—a decision that would have stamped the president’s credentials as a centrist moderate—his proposal was rejected by a parliamentary by 174 parliamentary votes to 110. Adding drama to the situation, in February 1962, Goulart’s brother-in-law, then governor of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, expropriated a subsidiary of the ITT telephone company, prompting stern rebuff in US Congress, with senators introducing a bill demanding the mandatory termination of financial aid to countries where US-owned companies had been


or were being expropriated without monetary compensation. In the months that followed, other Brazilian governors issued threats related to the expropriation of energy provider American & Foreign Power.

But Goulart understood that stabilizing the economy would require an injection of foreign credit into the Brazilian market, an operation that depended on the US Treasury and on the US government to place pressure on the IMF. Managers at the IMF had to be nudged by the US Treasury to extend a credit line to Brazil after the 1958 decision in Brazil to break with the fund. So Goulart knew he needed US support, even if he would have to keep the White House at arm’s length.

The tense tone of the conversation that unfolded when Goulart visited Kennedy at the White House in April 1962, should come as no surprise. Nor is it any wonder that Kennedy lectured Goulart on the risks of communist infiltration of the very labor unions that were becoming an increasingly influential source of support for the Brazilian president. That White House suspicious grew in the months following the visit is also unsurprising. By July, Dick Goodwin came to view Goulart as a lost cause. The US ambassador wanted the White House to signal to the Brazilian military that the United States would not be “necessarily hostile to any kind of military action whatsoever.” In conversation with President Kennedy, the Ambassador made his pitch by saying that Goulart was “giving the damn country away to the….” “Communists,” interjected the president. The administration in Washington was becoming increasingly exasperated with Goulart, and Kennedy decided to have the CIA disburse financial support to his opponents. Starting in October 1962, the CIA began to do so – a powerful signal to those Brazilian politicians who had thoughts of ousting the
And yet, the White House still kept an open line with Goulart.

BARGAINING. A meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council at the White House on December 11, 1962 resulted in the decision that Bobby Kennedy personally convey a stark choice to Goulart: ban the left from your administration to secure US support (via the Treasury and the IMF) or face the cost of abandonment. But Goulart was defiant, for only a few days later Brazilian voters would have a chance to either restore their president’s powers or consolidate a parliamentary system that curtailed his authority. Goulart won the vote by a landslide; out of the 12.3 million people who voted, 9.5 million cast their ballots in favor of the president. However, up his being granted full presidential powers on January 24, 1963, rather than roll out his reformist agenda, Goulart encountered entrenched congressional opposition and brewing turmoil on the streets. Inflation would soon peak at 75% and income per capita would fall for the first time since the World War II.

Back in Washington, Bobby Kennedy was now leading the argument for toughening the US posture towards Goulart. “They’re going to have to do something down there,” he told President Kennedy on 8 March 1963. “This is not something that [the US] Congress will tolerate, the American people will tolerate, or that you can tolerate.” The US Congress, Bobby said, is “going to have a hell of a time trying to sell any kind of help and assistance to a country that wants this kind of money from us and yet at the same time puts important communists or people who are very anti-United States in important positions of power ... We’re not

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86 US Embassy in Rio de Janeiro, Airgram A-710, Minutes of Conversation between Brazilian President João Goulart and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, NSF, Box 13, JFKL.
fooling around about it, we’re not going to continue this forever … He can’t have it both ways, can’t have the communists and put them in important positions and make speeches criticizing the United States and at the same time get 225-250 million dollars from the United States. He can’t have it both ways. He’s got to really make a choice, because you don’t have any choice about it.”

When Goulart’s minister of finance arrived in Washington two days later to negotiate the terms of a loan of $400 million, the conversations went nowhere. As the delegations met at the US Treasury, Lincoln Gordon, the US ambassador to Brazil, testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that communists had infiltrated Brazilian institutions. On October 7, 1963, President Kennedy asked his advisors, “Do you see a situation coming where we might […] find it desirable to intervene militarily ourselves?” Gordon said he feared a civil war.

The situation on the ground grew ever more polarized as Lyndon B. Johnson took office in the aftermath of the Kennedy assassination. On March 27, 1964, the US embassy warned the administration that failure to act in support of the military in the upcoming clashes that were likely to erupt across Brazil “might make Brazil the China of the 1960s.” The ambassador recommended that a naval task force be sent to Brazil with arms and ammunition (but no troops). On March 30, Secretary of State Dean Rusk warned President Johnson that the crisis would peak in the next day or so. On the morning March 31, speaking on

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87 Transcript of conversation between President Kennedy and Ambassador Gordon, March 8, 1963, Meeting 77.1, President’s Office Files (POF), JKFL.
88 Transcript of conversation between President Kennedy and Ambassador Gordon, October 7, 1963, Tape 114/A50, POF, JKFL.
90 Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Bundy, March 28, 1964, 9:30 a.m. CST, Tape F64.21, Side A, FNO 1, LBJL.
the phone from his ranch in Texas, Johnson was told that the coup against Goulart had begun. After the briefing, the president concluded by saying, "I think that we ought to take every step that we can." "Be prepared to do everything that we need to do ... I'd put everybody there, anyone that has any imagination or ingenuity ... we just can't take this one and I'd get right on top of it and stick my neck out a little."91 Johnson meant he would be willing to support a military coup against Goulart. At 13.30 on March 31, only a few hours after the coup had begun, a fleet led by the aircraft carrier USS Forrestal, transporting more than 100 tons of arms and ammunition including four tankers with half-a-million barrels of fuel, left Aruba in Puerto Rico bound for the Brazilian port city of Santos, with an expected arrival date of April 11.92 But on the April 1, Goulart fell without civilian resistance or military confrontation. At midday on April 2, the US government rushed to recognize the new dictatorial government of Brazil.93 Two days later Goulart fled into exile and remained as such for the rest of his life. "Well", Bobby Kennedy reminisced some years later, "Goulart got what was coming to him. Too bad he didn't follow the advice we gave him."94

Contributions to Scholarship and Implications for Policy

This article has offered a new theory of bandwagoning in world politics in which equilibrium emerges when rulers in an

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91 Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and George Ball, March 31, 1964, White House Audio Tape at the National Security Archives (accessed on 17 June 2018, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/).
92 Gaspari, A Ditadura Envergonhada, p. 109.
asymmetric relationship manage to successfully trade side payments for compliance. When this occurs, such an alignment can temporarily secure and consolidate the advantage of the rulers at home and abroad. More specifically, we have argued that leaders in a dyad will bandwagon under two specific conditions: when their goods-for-compliance deal satisfies the dominant state’s geostrategic interests and when the domestic political survival requirements of the incumbent in the secondary state are met. Whether bandwagoning dynamics emerge at all will be contingent on the strategic interaction between two individual rulers.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO SCHOLARSHIP. We began by noting the existence of undertheorized and inadequately analyzed dimensions of bandwagoning in world politics. Our conceptualization of the phenomenon as an interactive process through which two political leaders trade compliance for side payments that help the incumbent in the secondary state survive in office facilitates scholarly analysis of a recurring form of alignment in international relations. What is gained in exchange for the complexity we add to the study of bandwagoning? First, we provide microfoundations at the level of the individual political leaders who choose to bandwagon. Second, our conceptualization enriches the study of international alignments by moving away from the assumption that bandwagoning is a strategy states adopt from a static policy menu, and frames it as the outcome of an uncertain process of strategic interaction within a dyad. Third, this paper fills a gap in the literature by specifying the domestic-politics conditions under which bandwagoning is to be expected. And fourth, our definition and causal mechanism add the necessary clarity and rigor that is needed for the comparative analysis of bandwagoning.
Future research on bandwagoning would benefit from operationalizing the theoretical variables presented in this theory for testing against a larger set of cases. After constructing a database of cases, it would be possible to answer three sets of questions that we have not tackled in this article. Do institutions (e.g., formal alliances, structured bilateral commissions, and binational parliamentary caucuses) mitigate distributive conflict within a bandwagoning dyad, and does the absence of such institutions increase the odds of disruption and failure? How does winning-coalition size impact an incumbent’s choice whether or not to bandwagon? Does bandwagoning contribute to extending the life of an incumbent in office, isolating all other factors? Does it enhance the geopolitical preferences of the primary state, controlling for other hypothetical causes?

Finally, this theory would gain from further inspection under the prism of the behavioral turn in IR. The focus in this article has been on how structure and bargaining processes shape bandwagoning, leaving little room for detailed attention on the role of individual beliefs and decision-making processes. In particular cases of apparent irrationality – like João Goulart’s decision not to comply with the demands of the Kennedy White House – would be fertile ground for studying bandwagoning dynamics from a behavioral perspective.

IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY. For dominant states – particularly the United States – the implication of our argument is that gathering intelligence about potential targets for bandwagoning should focus less on the ideological inclinations of their rulers and more on the winning coalitions that keep them in power. More

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specifically, warning systems that alert US officials whenever target incumbents face a serious threat of abandonment by their domestic supporters would be particularly useful in guiding policy planning. For secondary states, our argument raises two issues. First, attempts at bandwagoning with superior powers are normally derailed when incumbents fail to communicate their resolve to comply with the dominant-state’s demands. Second, a leader’s alignment with a dominant state in exchange for side payments is bound to elicit popular reactions in societies that have historically experienced imperialism, colonialism, and other forms of hierarchical ordering. The policy implication that follows is straightforward: diplomatic communication with the dominant state ought to be crafted to convey resolve to comply while avoiding the association of alignment with a policy of national submission. Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran in 1978 learned this lesson the hard way. We can take anything away from this theory of bandwagoning, it should be that striking the right balance in an asymmetric relationship may be difficult, but it need not be impossible. The approaches adopted by Winston Churchill and the Spanish crown show there is a path.